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With the world moving towards being increasingly dependent on computers and automation, one of the main
challenges in the current decade has been to build secure applications, systems and networks. Alongside
these challenges, the number of threats is rising exponentially due to the attack surface increasing through
numerous interfaces offered for each service. To alleviate the impact of these threats, researchers have proposed
numerous solutions; however, current tools often fail to adapt to ever-changing architectures, associated
threats and 0-days. This manuscript aims to provide researchers with a taxonomy and survey of current
dataset composition and current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) capabilities and assets. These taxonomies
and surveys aim to improve both the efficiency of IDS and the creation of datasets to build the next generation
IDS as well as to reflect networks threats more accurately in future datasets. To this end, this manuscript
also provides a taxonomy and survey or network threats and associated tools. The manuscript highlights
that current IDS only cover 25% of our threat taxonomy, while current datasets demonstrate clear lack of
real-network threats and attack representation, but rather include a large number of deprecated threats, hence
limiting the accuracy of current machine learning IDS. Moreover, the taxonomies are open-sourced to allow
public contributions through a Github repository.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The world is becoming more dependent on connected actuators and sensors, regulating the life
of millions of people. Furthermore, sensor data is expected to increase by around 13%, reaching
35% of overall data communication by 2020, reaching a peak of 50 billion connected devices and
an increased Internet traffic reaching 30 GB on average per capita compared to around 10 GB in
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2016 [17]. While each of these devices in IoT system exchange collected data, associated services
often provide numerous interfaces to interact with the collected data, often increasing the attack
surface, highlighting the importance of network security. Therefore, it is crucial to build robust tools
to defend networks against security threats. Current detection tools are often based on outdated
datasets which, do not reflect the reality of network attacks, rendering the Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) ineffective against new threats and 0-days. To the best knowledge of the authors,
there is currently no survey and taxonomy manuscript analysing available datasets, nor providing
a taxonomy of the current network threats and the tools associated with them. The contributions
of this paper are threefold:
• An Intrusion detection systems survey and taxonomy is presented, including:
– An IDS Design Taxonomy
– IDS Evaluation Metrics
– A survey of IDS Implementations
• Evaluation of available datasets
• A Threat taxonomy is presented, categorized by:
– The Threat Sources
– The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Layer
– Active or Passive modes
– As well as an example of recent attacks
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 depicts the main differences between
intrusion detection systems and their main evaluation metrics. In section 3, IDS of the past decade
are reviewed and their individual contributions are assessed. Moreover, available datasets are
discussed highlighting their drawbacks and limitations. Section 4 provides a threat taxonomy.
2 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
IDS are defined as systems built to monitor and analyse network communication, as a result of
monitoring, and hence detect anomalies and intrusions.
Current IDS taxonomies focus on a single aspect of the IDS, such as the machine learning
algorithms that researchers can potentially use [32] [38], the characteristics of intrusion detection
systems [20] [6], or the features that should be used by researchers to design an IDS [91]. While
these provide valuable information, these surveys do not provide an global overview dedicated
to the design of next-generation IDS, but rather focus on a narrow field. In this section, a broad
taxonomy dedicated to the design of intrusion detection system is presented including the different
features an IDS can be composed of.
Figure 1 provides a taxonomy of intrusion detections systems. Figure 1 (Branch 1) includes the
general attributes characterizing IDS such as their role in the network, the information provided by
the intrusion detection system, the system requirements, and their usage. Branch 2 describes the
attributes related to the types of decisions, infrastructure in place, as well as their computational
location. Branch 3 includes the evaluation metrics. Branch 4 provides a descriptive analysis of their
location on the network. Branch 4 also includes an analysis of the triggers. Branch 5 places intrusion
detection systems in the context of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETS), and finally, Branch 6
highlights the shortcomings of IDS in the context of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [13]. The
different branches are subsequently described in Sections 2.1 through 2.4.
2.1 IDS Design Taxonomy
As mentioned, machine learning based IDS focuses on detecting misbehaviour in networks. When
an intrusion is detected the IDS is expected to log the information related to the intrusion (1.1.1).
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Fig. 1. Intrusion Detection Systems
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These logs can then be used by network forensic investigators to further analyse the breach or for
the learning process of the IDS itself. IDS are also expected to trigger alerts (1.1.2). The alert should
provide information on the threat detected, and the affected system. By raising an alert, authorized
users can take corrective action and mitigate the threat. Intrusion Detection System should also
include a mitigation feature, giving the ability of the system to take corrective actions (1.1.3) [13].
In order to build an efficient intrusion detection system, the output information provided by
the IDS to the end user is critical for analysis. The information recorded should contain intruder
identification information (1.2.1) and location (1.2.2) for each event. IP addresses and user credentials
are used to identify the intruder. The system design should be modular to adapt to the environment,
i.e. [66] propose to use biometric data to identify intruders. Additionally, log information can contain
metadata related to the intrusion, such as timestamp (1.2.3), intrusion layer (i.e. OSI) (1.2.4), intrusion
activity (1.2.5) whether the attack is active or passive and finally, the type of intrusion(1.2.6) [13].
In order for an IDS to be considered effective, the detection rate (1.3.1) and low false positive rate
are key aspects to consider. These can be evaluated using different metrics discussed in section 2.3.
Other important factors include the transparency and safety of the overall system (1.3.2). The
overall performance of the system has to be taken into account, these include memory requirements,
power consumption (1.3.3) and throughput (1.3.4). Lastly, the IDS should not introduce abnormal
behavior (1.3.5), hence a testing procedure should be set in place before deployment. The procedure
can include fuzzing to detect anomalies and bugs in the IDS. Such anomalies could be exploited by
an attacker to render the IDS useless or initiate a denial of service attack [13].
2.2 Distributed IDS
IDS can be distributed over multiple nodes in the network. Intrusion decisions in this case, can
be made in a collaborative or swarm like (2.1.1) fashion, or independent (2.1.2) manner. In a
collaborative manner, multiple nodes share a single decision. This collaboration can use statistical
techniques such as voting and game theory, while in an independent mode, all decisions are made
by individual nodes on the network.
Moreover, in this distributed manner, when all nodes are working with the same capacity,
it is considered a flat (2.2.1) infrastructure, unlike a clustered infrastructure (2.2.2) where the
nodes belong to clusters with different capabilities, each contributing to the decisions in a different
manner. The computation location is another aspect of distributed IDS. The centralized computation
location (2.3.1) works on data collected from the whole network. Unlike the centralized, the stand-
alone computation location (2.3.2) works on local data, disregarding decisions from other nodes.
A combination of both centralized and stand-alone, can also be achieved through cooperative
computation, such that each node can detect an intrusion on its own but also contributes to the
overall decision. Finally, IDS can also operate in hierarchal computation (2.3.4), where a cluster
send all intrusion detection to root node, where a decision is taken [13].
2.3 IDS Accuracy
A high detection rate is essential in a machine learning based IDS alongside the evaluation metrics
aforementioned. The main aspects to consider when measuring the accuracy are
• True Positive (TP): Number of intrusions correctly detected
• True Negative (TN): Number of non-intrusions correctly detected
• False Positive (FP): Number of non-intrusions incorrectly detected
• False Negative (FN): Number of intrusions incorrectly detected
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Hodo et al. [38], Buse et al. [9] and Aminanto et al. [7] discuss the main metrics to consider in
their respective work. These include the overall accuracy, decision rates, precision, recall, F1 and
Mcc.
OverallAccuracy =
TP +TN
TP +TN + FP + FN
(1)
Equation 1 provides the user with the probability that an item is correctly classified by the algorithm.
Detection Rates :
Sensitivity (aka Recall) = TP
TP + FN
Speci f icity =
TN
TN + FP
Fallout =
FP
TN + FP
Miss Rate =
FN
TP + FN
(2)
Equation 2 calculates the TP, TN, FP and FN detection rates respectively.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(3)
Equation 3 provides the percentage of positively classified incidents that are truly positive.
F1 = 2TP2TP + FP + FN (4)
Equation 4 represents the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
Mcc =
(TPxTN ) − (FPxFN )√(TP + FP)(TP + FN )(TN + FP)(TN + FN ) (5)
Equation 5 provides Matthews correlation coefficient. It can only be used in binary IDS in which
incidents are classified as either attack or normal.
Additionally, the CPU consumption, the throughput and the power consumption are important
metrics for the evaluation of intrusion detection systems running on different hardware on specific
settings such as high-speed networks, or on hardware with limited resources.
2.4 IDS Internals
The location of IDS on the network can tremendously impact the threat detection, hence the overall
accuracy of the system. As shown in Figure 1 (4.1), IDS can be located on a host computer, or
inline and respond in real time to threats (4.1.2). Note that the detection rate of an inline IDS often
degrades when used on a busy network. A hybrid system (4.1.3) being distributed both on the hosts
and through the network can also be implemented, using hosts as sensors for swarm intelligence.
The detection method is an important aspect of all intrusion detection system (4.2). Signature-
based (4.2.1) IDS are based on prior threat detection and the creation of accurate signatures. The
main advantage of this method is the high accuracy for known attacks. The IDS is , however,
unable to detect 0-days and polymorphic threats [12]. Signature-based is also known as ’Misuse
Detection’. Anomaly-based (4.2.2) depends on identifying patterns and comparing them to normal
traffic patterns. This method requires training the system prior to deploying it. The accuracy of such
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a system against 0-days and polymorphic threats is better when compared against signature-based
IDS. However, the false positive rate is often high.
Anomaly-based IDS are based on identifying patterns defining normal and abnormal traffic.
These IDS can be classified into subcategories based on the training method used. These categories
are identified respectively as statistical, knowledge-based and machine learning based. Statisti-
cal (4.2.2.1) includes univariate, multivariate and time series. Knowledge-based (4.2.2.2) uses finite
state machines and rules like case-based, n-based, expert systems and descriptor languages. Finally,
machine learning includes artificial neural networks, clustering, genetic algorithms, deep learning,
. . . Specification-based (4.2.3) combines the strength of both signature and anomaly based to form a
hybrid model.
2.5 Industrial IDS
Industrial Intrusion Detection Systems face different challenges, than traditional IDS. The au-
tomation of processes included in industrial network architectures often make use of specialized
hardware for specific industries such as petrochemical, aerospace, etc. These hardwares use specific
communication protocols such as ModBus, Profibus . . .
Table 1 summarizes how the industrial settings differ from traditional ones. Including the
dependency on embedded systems, hardware - such as PLC, Data Logger, etc - are an important
aspect of the network. Unlike traditional networks, PLCs are unable to run an integrated IDS due
to limited processing power. Moreover, the network architecture is fixed and rarely changes, as
industrial processes often cover a limited range of functions. These systems can be used for decades
without updates. However, industrial processes have a predictable element, which should be taken
into account when designing the IDS [106].
Table 1. Industrial Processes VS Traditional Processes
Industrial Processes Traditional Processes
Hardware Involvement Yes No
Network Topology Fixed Dynamic
Functionality Fixed and Small range Wide range
Protocols Simple Complex
Resources Limited Highly accessible
Performance and Availability Requires real-time Not dominant requirement
Behaviour Predictable Unpredictable
2.6 Feature Selection
"Feature Learning" [7] or "Feature Engineering" [28] plays an important role in building any IDS in
a way that chosen features highly affect the accuracy. Different features representations can be
used to address different areas of threat detection. Some of them are considered naive when they
contain basic information about the software or network. Others are considered rich when they
represent deeper details [28].
Obtaining features can be done using one of the following processes or a combination of them.
• Construction
• Extraction
• Selection
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Feature construction creates new features by mining existing ones by finding missing relations
within features. While extraction works on raw data and/or features and apply mapping functions
to extract new ones. Selection works on getting a significant subset of features. This helps reduce
the feature space and reduce the computational power.
Feature selection can be done through three approaches, as shown in Table 2, filter, wrapper and
embedded.
Table 2. Feature Selection Approaches
Approach Description Advantages Disadvantages
Filter [33] Selects the most meaning-
ful features regardless the
model
Low Execution Time
and over-fitting
May choose redun-
dant variables
Wrapper [65] Combine related variables
to have subsets
Consider interactions Over-fitting risk and
High execution time
Embedded [35] Investigate interaction in a
deeper manner than Wrap-
per
Result in an optimal
subset of variables
–
In the following section a survey of recent IDS is presented.
3 IDS AND DATASETS SURVEY
In the past decade numerous IDS were developed and evaluated against a range of published
available datasets. In this Section, these datasets are summarized, and their limitations highlighted.
Furthermore, recent IDS are analysed discussing algorithms used and the datasets the IDS were
evaluated against. Moreover, the trends in the algorithms used by research over the past decade are
discussed, highlighting a clear shift in the use of specific algorithms.
3.1 IDS and Associated Datasets
Researchers depended on benchmark datasets to evaluate their results. However, the datasets
currently available lack real-life properties. This is the reason that made most of the anomaly
intrusion detection systems not applicable for production environments [92], furthermore, they
unable of adapting to the constant changes in networks (i.e. new nodes, changing traffic loads,
changing topology, etc . . . ).
Viegas et al. [92] mentioned that for a dataset to be considered, it has to cover the following
properties: (a) Real network traffic (similar to production ones), (b) Valid, such that it has complete
scenarios. (c) Labeled, specifying the class of each record as normal or attack, (d) Variant, (e) Correct,
(f) Can be updated easily, (g) Reproducible in order to give researchers the space to compare across
different datasets, and finally (h) Sharable, hence it should not contain any confidential data.
Additionally, Iman et al [75] mentions that (i) having variant protocols is an important aspect of IDS
dataset, as well as (j) having an appropriate documentation for the feature and dataset collection
environment.
A benchmark for dataset is presented in [75]. The benchmark include DARPA [49], KDD’99 [36],
DEFCON [30], CAIDA [26], LBNL [50], CDX [73], Kyoto [81], Twente [82], UMASS [67], ISCX2012 [27]
and ADFA [18]. While the evaluation includes the attacks in each dataset and the features are
compared, the authors fail to provide a detailed analysis of the broader impact of their benchmark.
In this manuscript, a survey of machine learning IDS is provided, analyzing the associated
datasets and their short-comings.
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Table 3.1 introduces the most pre-eminent (i.e. most cited) IDS research from the past decade.
Each IDS is mentioned with a list of the algorithms used and the datasets the IDS was evaluated
against. Moreover, the attacks detected are also listed.
The algorithmic trends are then discussed alongside the attacks included in the datasets used.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of datasets used for research in the last decade. Only 11% of the
mentioned IDS used generated or simulated datasets. It is also clear through this analysis that most
datasets lack real-life properties which was previously in Section 3.1. Figure 2 also highlights the
use of KDD-99 as the dataset of choice. This dataset is deprecated, hence, this demonstrates the
inability of the intrusion detection systems presented in Table 3.1 to cope with the most recent
attacks.
Fig. 2. Distribution of Datasets Used for Evaluation over Discussed IDSs
Figure 3 visualize the attacks detected by the different IDS presented in Table 3.1. It is shown, that
the 4 attacks available in the KDD-99 dataset are the most covered, namely; DoS/DDoS, Probing,
R2L, U2R.
Fig. 3. Covered Attacks in Discussed IDS
Figure 4 (a) highlights the dominance of machine learning algorithms, when building an IDS.
As shown, both statistical and knowledge-based algorithms are less represented. Figure 4 (a) is
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: June 2018.
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organized by the categories defined in Figure 1 (Inner Circle), The algorithms defined in Fig-
ure 1 (4.2.2.2) (Center Circle) and finally the percentage of the IDS presented in Table 3.1 using
these algorithms (Outer Circle). Figure 4 (b) on the other hand, provides a visualization of the
distribution of the algorithms used by the IDS presented in Table 3.1. It is shown that ANN, SVM
and k-means are the most used algorithms overall.
(a) Distribution of all algorithms discussed in Figure 1
4 THREATS TAXONOMY
Building a generic and modular taxonomy for security threats is of high importance in order to
help researchers and cyber-security practitioners building tools capable of detecting various attacks
ranging from known to 0-day attacks.
Kendall et al. [45] proposed one of the earliest classifications of intrusions [92]. Kendall classified
intrusions into four categories namely: Denial of Service (DoS), Remote to Local (R2L), User to Root
(U2R) and Probing. In DoS, the attacker tend to prevent users from accessing a given service. When
the attacker tried to gain authorized access to the target system, either by gaining a local access or
promoting the user to a root user, these attacks were classified as R2L and U2R respectively. Finally,
probing was defined, by an attacker actively foot printing a system for vulnerabilities.
Donald Welch classified the common threats in wireless networks into seven attack techniques
(Traffic Analysis, Passive Eavesdropping, Active Eavesdropping, Unauthorized Access, Man-in-the-
middle, Session High-Jacking and Replay) [96]. In a paper by Sachin Babar et al. [10], the problem
is addressed from a different perspective. Threats are classified according to the Internet of things
security requirements (identification, communication, physical threat, embedded security and
storage management). Specific domain taxonomies have also grabbed the attention of researchers.
David Kotz [48] discusses privacy threats in mobile health (mHealth) domain. In the same manner,
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(b) Distribution of used algorithms discussed in Table 3.1
Fig. 4. Algorithms usage distribution in the discussed IDSs
Keshnee Padayachee [64], shows the security threats targeting compliant information and Monjur
Ahmed and Alan T. Litchfield [3] works on threats from a cloud computing point of view.
This Section classifies network threats based on the layers of the OSI model, provides examples
of attacks for different threat types and provides a taxonomy associating network threats and the
tools used to carry out attacks. The taxonomies aim at helping researchers building IDS, but more
importantly by associating the threats to the OSI model, as well as the threats to the tools used to
carry attack or take advantage of specific vulnerabilities, the taxonomies aim at achieving higher
accuracies and reducing the amount of false positives of current intrusion detection systems [77]
as well as building better datasets.
4.1 Threat Sources
Figure 5 identify network threats and provides a classification according to the following criteria
(I) Source of the threat, (II) Affected layer based on Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model
and (III) Active and Passive threats. The different threats are described hereafter (Note that the
taxonomy is available through a a Github repository for public access and contributions 1.
As shown, attacks can be targeting a single layer of the OSI model, but it is important to highlight
that other layers may also be affected. The taxonomy presented in this manuscript focus on the main
target layer of attack. An attack is also described to be active if it affects information, performance or
any aspect of the media on which it is running. In contrast to active attacks, during passive attacks
the attacker is concerned with either gathering information or monitoring the network. These
can be identified by their shape in Figure 5. Active attacks are represented by a rectangle shape,
while passive attacks are represented by an oval shape. Attacks like adware (2.1.3), spyware (2.1.4)
and information gathering (3.1) are considered passive attacks. DoS (1.1), Impersonation (1.4) and
Virus (2.1.2) are forms of active attacks. However, some attacks cannot be considered active or
passive until their usage is known. An example of this case are SQL-injections, if it is used for
1https://github.com/AbertayMachineLearningGroup/network-threats-taxonomy
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querying data from a database then it is passive. However, if it is used to alter data, drop tables or
relations then the attack can be considered as active.
4.1.1 Network Threats. Threats are initiated based on a flow of packet sent over a network.
Two of the most common forms of network threats are Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) (1.1) where an attacker floods the network with requests rendering the
service unresponsive. During Attacks legitimate users cannot access the services. Note that common
anomalies known as ’Flash Crowds’ are often mistaken with DoS and DDoS attacks [43]. Dos and
DDoS can be divided in four categories including flood attacks (1.1.1), amplification attacks (1.1.2),
protocol exploit (1.1.3), and malformed packets (1.1.4). These are defined respectively through
attack examples. Smurf attacks (1.1.1.1) depends on generating a large amount of ping requests.
Overflows (1.1.1.2) occurs when a program writes more bytes than allowed. This occurs when
an attacker sends packets larger than 65536 bytes (allowed in the IP protocol) and the stack does
not have an appropriate input sanitation in place. The ping of Death (1.1.4.1) attack occurs when
packets are too large for the routers and splitting is required. The Teardrop (1.1.3.1) attack takes
place when an incorrect offset is set by the attacker. Finally the SYN flood (1.1.1.3) attack happens
when the host allocates memory for a huge number of TCP SYN packets.
Packet forging (1.2) is another form of networking attack. Packet forging or injection is the
action in which the attacker generates packets that look the same as those of the network. These
packets can be used to perform certain action, steal information, etc. When the attacker intercepts
communications between two or more entities and starts to either control the communication
between them and alter the communication or listen to the network, this attack is referred to as a
’Man in theMiddle’ attack (1.3). Unlike ’Man in theMiddle’ attack, a ’Man In The Browser’ attack (1.4)
intercepts the browser to alter or add fields to a web page asking the user to enter confidential data.
Impersonation (1.5) or pretending to be another user can take different forms. The attacker may
impersonate a user to gain higher security level and gain access to unauthorized data (1.5.1) or use
cloned accounts, cloning (1.5.2) is common in social networks. Another impersonation form in
wireless networks are rogue access points (1.5.3). During an IP spoofing (1.5.4.1) attack an attacker
spoofs an IP address and sends packets impersonating a legitimate host. DNS spoofing - also known
as DNS cache poisoning - (1.5.4.2) is another type of spoofing. The attacker redirects packets by
poisoning the DNS. Finally, ARP spoofing (1.5.4.3) is used to perform attack like Man In the Middle,
in order to dissociate legitimate IP and MAC addresses in the ARP tables of the victims.
Scanning/enumeration are an essential step for initiating attacks. During scanning (1.6), the
attacker starts with searching the network for information such as, active nodes, the running
operating system, software versions, etc. As defined in [59], scanning has many forms,using
protocols such as TCP (1.6.1) or UDP (1.6.2). The last two examples of network attacks are media
access control (MAC) address flooding (1.7), and VLAN hopping attack (1.8). In MAC flooding (1.7),
the attacker is targeting the network switches and as a result, packets are redirected to the wrong
physical ports, while the VLAN hopping attack has two forms either switch spoofing (1.8.1) or
double tagging (1.8.2).
4.1.2 Host Threats. Host attacks target specific hosts or system by running malicious software
to compromise the system functionalities or corrupt it. Most host attacks are categorized under the
malware (2.1) category. This includes worms, viruses, adwares, spywares, Trojans and ransomware.
Viruses are known to affect programs and files when shared with other users on the network while
worms are known to self-replicate affecting multiple systems. Adwares are known for showing
advertisements to users when surfing the Internet or installing software. Although adware are less
likely to run malicious code, it can compromise the performance of a system. Spyware, gathers
information such as documents, user cookies, browsing history, emails, etc. or monitor and track
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user actions. Trojans often look like trusted applications, but allow the attacker to control the
device. Last, ransomware are a relatively new type of malware where the system is kept under the
control of the attacker - or a third entity - by encrypting the files until the user/organization pay a
ransom [1].
4.1.3 Software Threats. Code injection (3.2) can include SQL Injection to query the database,
resulting in obtaining confidential data, or deleting data by dropping columns, rows or tables.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is used to run malicious code to steal cookies or credentials. XSS have
three main categories. The first is persistent/stored XSS (3.2.2.1), in this case the script is saved in
the database and is executed every time the page is loaded. The second is Reflected XSS (3.2.2.2) in
which the script is part of the HTTP requests sent to the server. The last is DOM-based XSS (3.2.2.3)
which can be considered as an advanced type of XSS. The attacker changes values in the Document
Object Model (DOM) e.g. document location, document url, etc. DOM-based XSS are difficult to
detect as the script is never transferred to the server. Fingerprinting and misconfiguration are also
forms of software threats. Fake server certificates (3.5) should be considered while building web
applications or analysing communications.
4.1.4 Physical Threats. Physical attacks are a result of a tempering attempt on the network hard-
ware (edge, or other devices) or its configuration. This can include changing the configurations (4.2)
and to introducing backdoors (i.e. The Evil Maid).
4.1.5 Human Threats. The last category of networking attacks are the one based on human
actions. These includes user masquerade (5.1). Phishing is another form of human attacks in which
the attacker uses emails or other electronic messaging services to obtain credentials or confidential
data. When a user attempts to take higher privileges it is considered a human attack like User
to Root (5.3) and Remote to Local R2L (5.4). Additionally, a user can be denied an action such as
repudiation (5.5) attack. Human attacks can also include session hijacking or sniffing,these attacks
are based on the attacker gaining access over an active session to access to cookies and tokens.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of Covered Attacks in Discussed IDSs
Based on the taxonomy discussed in Figure 5 and the recent IDS in Table 3, it can be seen that
there are many threats that are not addressed by recent IDS. Figure 6 visualize all the threats
mentioned in the taxonomy. The associated percentage represents the the attacks covered by the
IDS discussed in Section 3.1, Table 3.1. As shown a large number of attacks are not covered.
4.2 Attacking Tools
Many tools [59] [40] have been developed to initiate different attacks. Figure 7 show the main
tools classified by the attacks they are used for. This can be used by researchers when building an
IDS for a specific threat, then the associated tools are the ones of interest. For example, for an IDS
classifying impersonation attacks, Caffe-Latte, Hirte, EvilTwin and Cain and Abel are the ones to
check. Yaga and SQL attack are used for U2R and so on.
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Tcpdump
Ethereal
Net2pcap
Snoop
Angst
Ngrep
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Dsniff
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Aimsniff
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Tcptrack
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IPgrab
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Nfdump
danger
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Bugbear virus
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TrojanProxyLWin32
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FTP99cmp
trojan.Win32.KillAV.ctp
Disable.b
P0f
Xprobe
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Queso
AmapV4.8
Disco
Sprint
Yaga
SQL attack
ntfsdos
Ping
Hping2
Hping3
Traceroute
Tctrace
Tcptraceroute
Traceporto
Fping
Arping
Jolt2
Blast20
Nemesy
Panther2
UDP Flood
FSMax
HOIC
Some Trouble
BlackEnergy
#Refref
Bubonic.c
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Shaft
Knight
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hping
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Packeth
Packit
Packet
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Tcpinject
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SendIP
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ARPspoof
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Nmap
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TTLscan
IKE-scan
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strobe
udp_scan
netcat
DoS 
DDoS 
Impersonate
Scanning
Information
Gathering
Remote access Trojan 
Sending Trojan 
Destructive Trojan 
Proxy Trojan 
FTP Trojan 
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Fingerprinting
U2R
R2L
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Packet 
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Fig. 7. Attacks Tools Example
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5 CONCLUSION
This manuscript aims at providing an overview of intrusion detection system internals, the way
they are expected to work, as well as evaluation criteria and classifications problems. Furthermore,
the manuscript tackles the problem of having a generic taxonomy for network threats. A proposed
taxonomy is presented for categorizing network attacks based on the source, OSI model layer and
whether the threat is active or passive. The prominent IDS research of the past decade (2008 -
2018) are analyzed. The analysis results in three main findings. Benchmark datasets lack real world
property and fail to cope with the constant changes in attacks and networks architectures.
Moreover, we present a taxonomy of tools and associated attacks, and demonstrate the current
IDS research only cover around 25% of the threats presented in the taxonomy. Furthermore we
highlight that, while machine learning is used by 97.25% of the surveyed IDS. ANN, k-means and
SVM represent the majority of the algorithms used. While these algorithms present outstanding
results, we also highlight that these results are obtained on outdated datasets and hence, not
representative of real-world architectures and attack scenarios.
Finally, the network threat taxonomy and the attacks and associated tool taxonomy are open-
sourced and available through Github, allowing both securiry and acdemic researchers to contribute
to the taxonomy and ensure its relevance in the future2.
2https://github.com/AbertayMachineLearningGroup/network-threats-taxonomy
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